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Abstract
Jason Brennan and Phillip Magness (2018) and (2020) argue that adjuncts are not exploited. We are
sympathetic to some of their points. We agree, for example, that certain ways in which adjuncts are
compared to sweatshop workers are offensive. For, as Brennan and Magness point out, there are
many respects in which adjuncts are much better off than sweatshop workers. However, we show that
the core insights of their paper are compatible with the view that adjuncts are exploited.
Furthermore, their more general views about exploitation expressed in Cracks in the Ivory Tower
actually lend support to the claim that adjuncts are exploited.
I. Introduction
There is some controversy as to the details, but there appears to be something of a con- sensus that
exploitation occurs when one person takes advantage of another person in a way that is unfair. This
often occurs when the victim is vulnerable in some way, and the exploitative arrangement then takes
unfair advantage of this vulnerability. It is also fairly uncontroversial that exploitation need not
involve harm; exploitative arrangements are often beneficial to the victim, given the available
alternatives. (See Benn, p. 138; Feinberg, pp. 176 – 9; Brewer, p 86; Levine, pp. 66 – 7; Moore, p. 53;
Wertheimer 1996 pp. 13 – 15; and Wood, p. 148) This yields the potentially counter-intuitive result
that it can be rational for the victim of an exploitative arrangement to voluntarily agree to be
exploited. Wertheimer distinguishes between exploitation that is mutually advantageous, in which
both the exploiter and the person being exploited benefit from the arrangement, and exploitation
that that is harmful to the person being exploited, as well as between exploitation that is
non-consensual, in which the exploited person withholds consent or in which her ability to consent is
eroded, and consensual exploitation, in which the exploited person is able to and has given
appropriately voluntary consent to the exploitative arrangement. (Wertheimer p. 14) Wertheimer
illustrates how mutually advantageous, consensual exploitation can occur by reference to an example:
An unexpected blizzard hits an area and people rush to the hardware store to buy a
shovel. The hardware store owner sees the opportunity to make an ab- normal profit
and raises the price of a shovel from $15 to $30. If B agrees to pay $30 for the shovel,
because the shovel is worth more than $30 to B under the circumstances, then the
transaction is clearly Pareto superior. Both parties gain. But B feels exploited because B
gains less (or pays more) than B thinks reasonable. ...We need not deny that B gains
from [the] transaction, all things considered. Rather, we say that A exploits B because we
believe that B pays too high a price for what he or she gains. (Wertheimer, p. 22)
In this case, the storm has created a vulnerability, in the form of an urgent need for a shovel; the
hardware store owner then takes unfair advantage of the situation by charging an unreasonably high
price for the shovels. Wertheimer continues:
There are at least some cases of alleged exploitation in which B’s consent is not
defective… In many cases of alleged exploitation, A takes advantage of B’s cir-
cumstances to get B to agree to a mutually advantageous transaction to which B would
not have agreed under better or perhaps more just background condi- tions, where A
has played no direct causal role in creating those circumstances, where A has no special
obligation to repair those conditions, and where B is fully informed as to the
consequences of various choices. Although B might prefer to have a different range of
options available, B can make a perfectly rational decision as to the advisability of the
various options. (Wertheimer p. 27)
For example, consider a wealthy investor who acquires the patent for a life-saving med- ication and
then immediately raises its price, such that it is now fifty-five times more ex- pensive than it was. If
the patient really does require the medication to survive, it might be rational for her to willingly pay
the higher price. But it is still exploitative, because the investor takes unfair advantage of the patient’s
vulnerability. And it seems no less exploitative if the medication treats such conditions as chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease or cirrho- sis, which the patient may have had a hand in creating. Now
that the patient requires the medication to survive, it is unfair to take advantage of that fact to compel
her to pay such an inflated price.
II. Adjuncts and Good Exit Options
Brennan and Magness argue that adjuncts have good exit options. As they put (2018, p. 65) it:
[T]o defend the Adjunct Exploitation Thesis, one would need to show that adjuncts’
employers are like [sweatshop owners], and adjuncts are like [sweatshop workers]. But, as we
discussed above, this analogy seems false, in general, because adjuncts, unlike [sweatshop
workers], have good exit options.
This suggests an argument:
The Argument from Good Exit Options
(1) If  one has good exit options, then one is not exploited.
(2) Adjuncts have good exit options.
(3) So, adjuncts are not exploited.
Premise (1) is an implication of some standard theories of exploitation. Premise (2) is motivated by a
host of empirical data and analysis marshaled by Brennan and Magness. Among other things,
adjuncts could find much better work at GEICO. Let’s say that an option is a ‘good exit option’
relative to another option iff  it is better than the other option.
We will assume that (2) is true and do not challenge any of the empirical claims Brennan and
Magness make. Our target is instead premise (1). First, Brennan and Magness cannot accept premise
(1). In Cracks in the Ivory Tower, they argue that university faculty use gen ed requirements to exploit
undergraduates. As they put it (2019, p. 157):
Why do universities require gen eds…? [T]he real reason for gen eds is that they represent a
way for certain faculty to capture student’s tuition dollars. Faculty exploit students for their
own selfish benefit.
They also say (p. 183) that: “It’s difficult to avoid the conclusion that the responsible professor is
inappropriately exploiting the student’s needs to meet the university’s graduation requirements.”
Finally, Brennan and Magness suggest (2019, p. 185) that:
We’re not saying gen eds are a complete disaster. And there are some schools, such as the
University of Chicago, that have well-designed curricula that really do seem (anecdotally) to
create well-rounded, liberally educated students. But what most universities do is require
students to take a smattering of unconnected classes from here and there, plus a stream of
classes in the most enrollment-dependent department(s). This is best explained as academic
rent-seeking, as a means for professors to exploit students for their own benefit.
Suppose university faculty exploit students enrolled in gen eds in the way Brennan and Magness
suggest. Then (1) is false. Just as adjuncts have good exit options, students enrolled in gen eds have
good exit options. They could quit college and work for GEICO just as adjuncts could quit their jobs
and work for GEICO. They could do a little research to find the very best gen ed satisfying courses
and take those. They could study on their own and then test out of many of the gen ed courses. They
could take gen ed courses at a community college for a much better price. If Brennan and Magness
are right that university faculty exploit students through gen ed courses, then exploitation is not ruled
out by the presence of  good exit options. And so (1) is false.
Second, we can imagine hypothetical sweatshops in which employees have good exit options
but are nevertheless exploited. Imagine on the road to the factory, there is a billboard advertising jobs
that are much better than the one the sweatshop offers. But the employees will never look up high
enough to see the billboard. Perhaps this is because they have been trained to think it is shameful to
look up while walking to work. Or perhaps they have unconscious biases that prevent them from
looking up. Perhaps it is because they have a strong sense of vocation regarding the particular sort of
work done at the sweatshop. Maybe they are just weirdly devoted to making clothes. Sometimes they
think about looking up. But the shame or unconscious biases or strong sense of vocation prevents
them from doing so. It still seems like they are being exploited. Indeed, there is a respect in which the
sweatshop workers are more gravely wronged in a case like this. In normal cases, if the sweatshop
weren’t there, the employees would be worse off. They would starve to death or have an even worse
domestic job. But in the hypothetical case, sweatshop workers would be better off if the sweatshop
was not there. For in that case, there would be no one to take advantage of their socialization and
quirks. And they would end up with a much better job.
We don’t think it is completely implausible to think that the way in which adjuncts have good
exit options is morally similar to the way in which college students and the workers in the
hypothetical example have good exit options. Anyone who has gone to grad school knows that
would-be academics are socialized to feel great shame at the idea of leaving the profession and to
develop a strong sense of academic vocation. Being an academic becomes so much a part of one’s
identity that leaving the profession can feel like going through divorce or having a loved one die or
that one is abandoning one’s duties. Perhaps there are other viable employment options, but it is
plausible there are all sorts of unconscious biases at work in would-be academics that make them feel
as if they have invested all this time in pursuing an academic career and should therefore keep going.
Or, in spite of the evidence, they may feel unqualified to do anything else. It is plausible that adjuncts
are partly to blame for this. If they were just more rational maybe they would look into a job at
GEICO. But people in general aren’t rational. Perhaps the sweatshop workers are irrational for
refusing to look up. Perhaps they deserve part of the blame for their predicament. Nevertheless, they
are exploited. In the same way, it is not completely implausible to hold that adjuncts are exploited
even if  they have good exit options.
III. Adjuncts, Good Exit Options, and the List
There is a different way of understanding Brennan and Magness’ argument. They provide a long list
of features of adjuncts. The list includes ways in which adjuncts typically differ from sweatshop
employees. We can add to the list ways in which adjuncts typically differ from students enrolled in
gen eds.
The List
● Adjuncts are highly educated.
● Adjuncts are good at collecting data and analyzing trends.
● Adjuncts had lots of  time to think about alternatives, analyze risks, and seek alternatives.
● Adjuncts’ work isn’t worth that much.
● Adjuncts are not underpaid for the amount of work they do and if they work a lot of hours it
is because they are bad at their jobs.
● Students reasonably repose trust in their institution and their faculty to promote their
interests whereas adjuncts are mere employees.
● Students are lied to by faculty about the purpose of  gen eds whereas adjuncts are not.1
The List allows us to offer a new argument. The presence of good exit options is not sufficient to
rule out exploitation. But perhaps the presence of good exit options together with all the other items
on the list is. This suggests:
The Revised Argument from Good Exit Options
(1) If one has good exit options and also possesses all the other features on the List, then one is
not exploited.
(2) Adjuncts have good exit options and also possess all the other features on the List.
(3) So, adjuncts are not exploited.
We think premise (1) of the revised argument is false. With one exception to be discussed below, the
items on the list are irrelevant to exploitation. Or, at the very least, they are only relevant insofar as
they suggest that adjuncts have good exit options. And the issue about good exit options, though
pressing, has already been addressed. And it is one that we think cannot be accepted by Brennan and
Magness based on what they say in Cracks in the Ivory Tower. The one item on the list that we think
might be relevant is the claim that adjuncts’ work isn’t worth that much. We disagree with Brennan
and Magness about this and will discuss it in the next section. Keeping our disagreement with
Brennan and Magness about the value of adjunct work in mind, our argument against premise (1) is
this:
The Argument from Individual Irrelevance
1 An anecdote: One of us has a spouse who has adjuncted at five institutions. At each
institution, at least one person has told her that adjuncting would be “a way to get her foot in
the door.” They have always said that, and it has worked out only once--one institution
offered this person a full-time, non-permanent, non-tenure track position after five years’
worth of  semester-to-semester adjunct contracts.
(1) The items on the List are individually irrelevant to whether exploitation occurs.
(2) There is no reason to think that a bunch of items that are individually irrelevant to whether
exploitation occurs would together be relevant to whether exploitation occurs.
(3) If (1) and (2), then the fact that adjuncts satisfy the items on the List is not relevant to
whether adjuncts are exploited.
(4) So, the fact that adjuncts satisfy the items on the List is not relevant to whether adjuncts are
exploited.
Let us say a bit about why (1) is true: Consider sweatshop workers. Sweatshop workers are not lied to
about the job they take. But they are nevertheless exploited. If sweatshop workers were highly
educated and good at analyzing patterns and trends, that would not imply that they are not exploited.
Unlike students at universities, sweatshop workers do not reasonably repose trust in the sweatshop.
But they are still exploited. If sweatshop employees worked so much just because they were bad at
their jobs or because they were so devoted to their vocation, that would still count as exploitation. If
fast sweatshop workers did the relevant work in an hour, the sweatshop workers that take all day to
get their pay would still be exploited. Regarding the fact that adjuncts are to blame for their
predicament: Exploitation theorists allow that culpability for one’s vulnerability is compatible with
exploitation. As Zwolinski puts it (2018, p. 156):
To exploit someone is to take unfair advantage of their vulnerability. But that vulnerability
need not be the product of force, or indeed of any injustice at all. It might simply be the
product of bad luck, or even a (culpably) bad choice. One can take unfair advantage of a bad
situation one had no role in creating.
Brennan and Magness (2018, p. 56) seem to accept this point as well.
Imagine adjuncts routinely die. No one disputes that the deaths are due to stabbing. No one
disputes that it is university administrators doing the stabbing. But there is a dispute about whether
adjuncts are murdered. There are a number of embarrassing features adjuncts have that make their
deaths different than typical murders. Adjuncts had lots of good exit options. Adjuncts got
themselves into a position to be killed by administrators and should have seen it coming. Adjuncts
were not deceived in the course of being killed. Adjuncts, unlike students, cannot reasonably repose
trust in their institution and administrators. No theory of murder implies that any of these things is
relevant. No standard example of  murder has that implication either.
We think that if one wanted to know whether adjuncts are murdered, one would not do well
to think about all of the ways in which adjuncts are to blame for their deaths. In the same way, the
embarrassing empirical claims about adjuncts that Brennan and Magness cite are not relevant to the
question of  whether adjuncts are exploited.
Note that adjuncts do not have their fingernails pulled out by university administrators. Nor
do university administrators openly mock adjuncts in front of their children. These are bad things. If
these were to be added to an act of exploitation, they would make things even worse for adjuncts. But
none of that implies that in their absence one is not exploited. Similarly, adjuncts enjoy freedom from
a bunch of other bad things (as the items on Brennan and Magness’ List indicate). But that does not
imply that they are not exploited.
So our view is this: Brennan and Magness have not done enough to explain how the various
items on the List are relevant to exploitation. We can see how some of the items on the List might be
embarrassing to adjunct advocates. We can see how other items on the list indicate additional bad
things that would make adjunct exploitation worse. But we can’t see how they are relevant to the
question of  whether exploitation occurs.
About premise (2) of our argument: We don’t see how taking a bunch of things that are not
relevant to whether adjuncts are exploited and combining them generates something that is relevant
to whether adjuncts are exploited. It’s not that we have an in principle objection to the idea that
combining individually irrelevant things adds up to something that is relevant. It’s just that we think
Brennan and Magness have not done enough to indicate how the combination of all of these factors
that we find to be irrelevant to exploitation supports their view that adjuncts are not exploited.
In summary: We are open to the idea that these things are somehow sufficient to rule out
exploitation. But we just don’t see it. Brennan and Magness should take this as a friendly invitation to
further spell out their argument and to further explain how the items on the List, if indeed we are
correct in interpreting them as giving the List argument, are relevant to exploitation.
IV. The Value of  Adjunct Work
Brennan and Magness think that adjunct work is not valuable. Colleges and universities pay adjuncts.
But what they get for that pay is not valuable. They get a little bit of teaching. But universities get
much more, Brenna and Magness suggest, from other sorts of  faculty. As they put it (2016, p. 57):
To test whether adjuncts are underpaid, we must first identify a suitable comparison group
among the ranks of full-time faculty. A realistic analysis should compare adjunct faculty pay
and working hours to full-time positions with comparable work obligations and which
requiring qualifications similar to those adjunct possess.
They then say a bit about what it would take to find the right comparison group. They can’t be
compared with full-time and tenure-track faculty at four-year colleges. One reason is that they don’t
have the same credentials.
Note that most full-time and tenure-track faculty positions at four-year colleges and
universities require applicants to possess a PhD or equivalent terminal degree. Multiple
statistical studies find that most adjuncts lack a terminal degree; only 18–30% of adjuncts
possess a doctorate. The majority of adjuncts only hold master’s degrees (or less). These
credentials may suffice for certain types of undergraduate instruction on a per-class basis, but
someone with only a master’s degree is not a serious applicant for a full-time position at
most four-year institutions.
We don’t think identity of credentials is necessary for meaningful comparison of pay between
two groups. For example: The authors of this paper have PhDs. If we worked in a sweatshop
alongside people with masters degrees and if we did similar work but got much more money, health
insurance, etc. than our colleagues with masters and bachelors degrees, we think it would be
meaningful to compare what we make to what our colleagues with masters and bachelors degrees
make. Furthermore, with the way the job market is heading, we would be very surprised if the ranks
of adjuncts with PhDs did not continue to increase. And we personally know many adjuncts with
PhDs. Even if  they are in the minority, it is nevertheless worth asking whether they are exploited.
So Brennan and Magness take differences in credentials to be relevant. They also discuss
differences in work:
A second consideration for any comparison is the actual workloads associated with different
levels of faculty appointments. Adjuncts are hired to teach; contractual expectations for most
adjunct positions are confined to teaching-related activities. This includes time spent on
lecture preparation, time in the classroom, timely submission of grades at the end of the
semester, and interacting with students via office hours or email. In contrast, full-time faculty
are expected to do, and in fact do, much more.
Brennan and Magness give another list. This time the list is about all the things faculty do
that adjuncts don’t do. They then find a certain class of full-time faculty with heavy teaching loads
that they think still can’t be meaningfully compared to adjuncts, but that nevertheless are the best
comparison. And so we think there are really two arguments here. Which argument is operative will
be determined by which horn of a dilemma one accepts. Either adjuncts can be meaningfully
compared to the relevant faculty or not. If  they cannot, then we get this argument:
The Argument from Incomparability
(1) Non-adjunct faculty are expected to do a lot more than adjunct faculty.
(2) If (1), then the pay adjuncts receive cannot be meaningfully compared to the pay that
non-adjunct faculty receive.
(3) If  (1) and (2), adjunct labor isn’t worth that much.
(4) So, adjunct labor isn’t worth that much.
We reject (3). We think that even if adjunct work is incomparable with non-adjunct work, adjunct
work is valuable. This is mainly because we think the value of work need not be compared to the2
value of other work in order to be valuable. Here is our argument: A typical adjunct is paid around a
certain amount per course. A typical course taught by an adjunct gets the university much more than
what they pay the adunct. An investment that gets you a lot more money than you put in is worth a
lot. So a typical adjunct’s work is worth a lot. No comparison is needed to show that adjunct work is
valuable.
Brennan and Magness have another argument. They think that although adjunct work and
non-adjunct work are incomparable, they can make generous assumptions to the adjunct that will
allow for a comparison. But that comparison is nevertheless unfavorable. Here is their argument.
The Argument from Unfavorable Comparison
(1) Non-adjunct faculty make less per hour than adjunct faculty.
(2) If  (1), then adjunct labor isn’t worth that much.
(3) So, adjunct labor isn’t worth that much.
We reject both premise (1) and premise (2). Regarding premise (1): Comparisons of the monetary
compensation of tenure-track faculty with that of adjunct faculty are not straightforward, because
tenure-track faculty positions are full-time and adjunct contracts are part-time. The annual income of
a part-time worker would therefore be much less than that of a full-time worker, even if their wages
were identical on an hourly basis. A significant part of the reason that tenure-track faculty make much
more annually than adjunct faculty is that tenure-track faculty are full-time and adjunct faculty
generally are not. Brennan and Magness solve this problem by converting a pair of hypothetical
2 Presumably, Brennan and Magness intend this discussion of the value of adjunct labor to reflect the
contribution this labor makes to the school’s achievement of its institutional goals in a way that is
relevant to the quantity of resources the institution would be justified in devoting to compensating
the people who perform that labor. If adjunct labor makes a proportionally greater contribution to
the institution’s achievement of its goals, the institution is justified in devoting a proportionally
greater portion of its budget to compensating its adjuncts; if their contribution is proportionally less,
it is justified in providing less compensation.
compensation packages, one corresponding to a typical tenure-track position, the other
corresponding to someone who “works a 4-4 course load, split between two different campuses,”
into an equivalent hourly wage, and then comparing the resulting hourly wages.
According to them, a typical entry-level tenure-track contract in the humanities pays $47,500
per year. If we assume a typical 2,080-hour full-time working year, this results in an effective hourly
wage of $22.84. But if we factor in non-monetary benefits such as employer-provided health
insurance, the effective hourly wage plus benefits works out to $30.37. Brennan and Magness point
out, however, that if we assume a more aggressive approach to research, as would be typical of a
faculty member hoping to earn tenure, such that our young professor maintains a 53-hour per week
schedule throughout the year, this effective hourly wage plus benefits falls to $24.33. (Brennan and
Magness 2019, p. 154)
A typical “full-time adjunct” contract, on the other hand, would involve 40 hours of work
per week, but only for two 16-week semesters per year. During the rest of the time, this adjunct is not
under contract and is not being paid. Brennan and Magness assume that this person earns $26,500
per year, devotes 1,280 hours to this work, and does not earn non- monetary benefits. (Brennan and
Magness 2019, p. 153) This works out to an effective hourly wage of $20.70, which Brennan and
Magness claim is “only slightly below the hourly rate for our entry level, full-time assistant professor.”
(Brennan and Magness 2019. p.154) They acknowledge that the difference is greater when we include
the value of the non-monetary parts of the full-time compensation package, but still suggest that the
overall effective hourly wages are similar.3
The effective hourly wage, including benefits, of the full-time contract is 1.5 times that of the
part-time contract. Furthermore, as Brennan and Magness acknowledge, because adjunct contracts
are structured semester-to-semester, adjuncts are paid only during the two 16-week semesters, or at
most 32 weeks per year. Someone who relies only on adjunct teaching would have no income during
the other 20 weeks of the year. This puts the full- time adjunct into the situation of having a full-time
job for 16 weeks between August and December, then being unemployed for two to six weeks during
December and January, then having a full-time job again for another 16 weeks between January and
May or June, and then being unemployed for eight to twelve weeks during June, July, and August.
This would represent a significant hardship for someone who was trying to make a living as an
adjunct. By contrast, a person with a legitimate full-time contract, even if it were only over the
9-month academic year, would likely have the option of structuring her payment schedule so that she
would be paid over 12 months. (One of  us has a payment schedule structured in this manner.)
This way of comparing adjunct compensation with full-time compensation is problematic in
at least two ways, both of which owe to the fact that academic employment contracts are not
structured in terms of an hourly wage. First, the effective hourly wage can be easily manipulated by
varying the amount of time the person devotes to her job. Someone who spent no time outside of
class preparing for class, grading assignments, or meeting with students and did no research
whatsoever would have a very high effective hourly wage; someone who worked twenty hours per
day, seven days per week would have a much lower effective hourly wage.
The second problem is caused by the fact that full-time, tenure-track positions carry
responsibilities in addition to teaching that part-time, adjunct positions do not. Brennan and Magness
3 Additionally, adjuncts generally have little or no control over various aspects of their work that
tenured faculty take for granted: adjuncts are not likely to have much influence on which courses they
teach, when those courses are scheduled to meet, or even whether they will be scheduled to teach
any courses from semester to semester. Since, as contingent faculty, they lack voting rights in their
departments or at any other organizational level, they have no say on what policies their
departments, colleges, or universities will adopt.
attempt to account for this by guesstimating the number of hours per year a typical tenure-track
assistant professor would spend conducting research, but converting a non-hourly compensation
structure to an effective hourly wage is no more sensible in this context than in the previous one.
Tenure-track contracts are often explicit about how one’s effort should be allocated among
one’s various responsibilities. An institution whose priorities are centered on research might assign
responsibilities for allocation of effort at 60% or 70% research, 20% or 30% teaching, and 10%
service, whereas an institution with priorities centered on teaching might assign responsibilities at
60% teaching, 30% research, and 10% service. A “teaching professor” position, with no research
responsibilities at all, might stipulate an allocation of  effort of  90% teaching and 10% service.
One of us has a tenured position at a medium-sized state university with significant research
requirements but a primary focus on teaching. Their contract carries a 3-3 teaching load and assigns
allocation of effort at 60% teaching, 30% research, and 10% service. We believe that it is plausible to
interpret these subdivisions as applying to one’s compensation. It would, after all, be highly odd to
claim that, although one is expected to allocate 70% of one’s effort toward one’s teaching and
service-related duties, that one is nevertheless being paid entirely for one’s research. Instead, it seems
natural that if one’s contract stipulates that 60% of one’s effort should be allocated to teaching, then
60% of  one’s compensation package is in compensation for one’s teaching.
If we break things down this way, then, given my (the author with a tenured position’s) base
salary at the time of hire, 60% allocation of effort to teaching, and teaching duties of six courses per
year, am paid $5,500 per three-credit class. Adjunct teaching contracts at the same institution pay only
$3,801 per three-credit class. That means that I get paid 1.4 times per class than adjuncts at my
institution.
But, as Brennan and Magness point out, this way of calculating one’s effective com-
pensation ignores the value of the non-monetary benefits package that is also part of the
compensation package for many full-time jobs. Brennan and Magness suggest that the value of this
package is 30% of the base salary. If so, then the value of my compensation package per three-credit
class rises to $7,150, which is 1.88 times what an adjunct would earn to teach the same class. In
contrast to Brennan and Magness’ estimates, adjuncts actually get much less for the same work.
This same institution has a class of permanent, full-time, non-tenure-track teaching po-
sitions. A typical entry level contract of this type has a salary of $45,000, an allocation of effort of
90% teaching and 10% service, no expectation of any research, and a course-load of 4-4. This
workload is highly comparable, though not identical, to the workload of the “full-time adjunct”
Brennan and Magness discuss, who is able to put together contracts for two courses per semester
each at two different institutions, for a course-load of 4-4, but with no research or service
requirement. This Teaching Professor contract yields an effective compensation of $5,062.50 per
three-credit class, which is 1.33 times what an adjunct would be paid to teach the same class. But
because this position is full-time, it is also eligible for benefits. If we help ourselves to Brennan and
Magness’s estimate that the value of such a package would be equivalent to 30% of one’s base salary,
this works out to an effective compensation value of $6,733 per three-credit class, which is 1.77 times
the compensation of an adjunct for the same class. Again, in contrast to Brennan and Magness’
estimates, adjuncts actually get much less for the same work. When one considers that the Teaching
Professor position is permanent, and therefore provides much greater job security than is enjoyed by
any adjunct, and that the teaching professor can structure her payment schedule to extend over the
full 12 months of  the year, the terms of  the adjunct’s employment are even more unfavorable.
The unfairness involved with exploitation can be procedural, in which case the exploiter
makes unfair use of a defect in the process by which the transaction is made, or substantive, in which
case the unfairness concerns the terms of the agreement, rather than how the agreement was
reached. What best explains these types of unfairness is a matter of ongoing dispute, and the correct
account of substantive unfairness is particularly controversial. In light of this, we think it best to4
remain neutral about the nature of  unfairness, and to instead rely on pre-theoretic considerations.
We argue that, if an institution were to make a standard practice of hiring persons to perform
a specific set of responsibilities in exchange for a certain level of compensation on a per-unit basis, it
would be unfair to simultaneously make a standard practice of hiring other, similarly qualified and
credentialed persons to perform this specific set of responsibilities but with significantly lower
compensation on a per-unit basis. If an institution is willing to make a practice of providing a
full-time teacher with a compensation package of a certain monetary value in exchange for teaching a
three-credit introductory-level course, then that is what the institution has judged to be fair
compensation, on a per-unit basis, for teaching that course. It would therefore be unfair for the
institution to make a practice of providing a compensation package of significantly less value to a
similarly qualified and credentialed part-time teacher, on a per-unit basis, for teaching a similar
introductory course.
V. A Better Way to Assess the Value of  Adjunct Work
In the previous section, we assumed for the sake of argument that Brennan and Magness’ main idea
about how to make comparisons about labor is correct. We argued that, by their own lights, Brennan
and Magness should think that adjunct labor is very valuable. In this section, we provide a different
way of comparing adjunct work with the work of other faculty. We think our way of doing it is better
than Brennan and Magness’. And if we are right, then adjunct labor is even more valuable than what
we suggested in the previous section.
Brennan and Magness suggest that we should compare different sorts of faculty on the basis
of what they do. But they seem to think that what one’s contract says is a reliable proxy for what one
does. If the contract says they teach four classes and nothing else, we can infer that that is what they
do and that is all the institution gets from them. If the contracts say they are to allocate 70% of their
time to research, then that indicates how much time they actually spend on research. We think this is
mistaken. We think what the contracts say is not at all a reliable proxy for what academics actually do
or how they actually allocate their time. We think it is better to consider two alternative points of
comparison. First, we should compare faculty in light of what they are under pressure to do. Second, we
should compare faculty in light of what they actually do and look at what they do directly rather than by
proxy. People under similar pressures and with similar productivity can be meaningfully compared.
Imagine there is a sweatshop. Imagine that the contract explicitly says that workers in the
sweatshop only have to work two hours every other day. But imagine that nevertheless sweatshop
workers work 20 hour days every day. So they do much more than what is in their contract. This
seems compatible with exploitation no matter what the contract explicitly says. Furthermore,
employees are sometimes under pressure to do much more work than what their contract specifies.
The pressure does not come from what their contract says. But it instead comes from other sources.
So if the sweatshop employees are under pressure in various ways to work 20hr days even though
their contracts are much more lenient, then that is relevant to exploitation.
Magness spent some time as an adjunct. He describes his experience here :5
All of these features considered together mean that even an adjunct on a 4/4 teaching load
should have ample additional free time to do other things as long as he or she is an effective
time manager when it comes to teaching obligations. That includes everything from
publishing (in order to strengthen your chances at attaining a full time teaching position or
5 https://philmagness.com/2015/04/the-myth-of-the-minimum-wage-adjunct/
4 See Wertheimer ch 7 for a rich discussion of  these issues.
equivalent research position) to seeking out other sources of income. I can also speak to this
first hand as it is something I learned to do quickly during my own period as a full-time
adjunct ca. 2008-2009. I was not anything close to well off during this period of my career,
but with a little basic time management I not only met my teaching obligations but I (1)
finished a dissertation, (2) wrote several peer reviewed articles, (3) composed a substantial
part of  an academic press monograph, and (4) found more permanent employment.
Magness was under pressure to publish even though it was not specified in his contract. He reacted
to this pressure by publishing in excellent journals. For this reason, the institution he adjuncted for
got a bunch of free research from him. And this is true even though his contract only required that
he teach. When we look at what the relevant institution got from Magness while he was an adjunct,
we should look at more than what his contract said. We should also include the free research it got
from him. When evaluating the CV of an adjunct profiled in an article, Brennan criticizes the adjunct
for failing to publish. He says this :6
● As far as the article indicates, she’s been focusing on perfecting teaching rather than
publishing in the best journals.
● She seems to have no research.
● Further, she claims she is getting paid very poorly per hour. As Magness explains, in
the “Myth of the Minimum Wage Adjunct”, if that’s true, then she must be spending
a ridiculous amount of time outside the classroom prepping for her classes. Since
she’s presumably teaching introductory classes, this is even more inexcusable.
We think this is in tension with what Brennan and Magness say when calculating the value of adjunct
work. Brennan and Magness tell us that adjunct work isn’t that valuable and that adjuncts aren’t
exploited because all they do is teach four classes a semester and they have the summers off. They
have plenty of time to get another job. And with another job they should be fine financially. Their
employer won’t give them much. But the employer doesn’t get much from them either.
Contrast this with what Brennan and Magness say when evaluating adjunct CVs. They
criticize adjuncts for not doing research and not publishing in the best journals. We do not see how
those two recommendations can be easily harmonized. It is very difficult to follow both pieces of
advice. It is not easy to get an outside job and extra work during the summer, on the one hand, but
to also publish in the best journals, on the other.
Developing and sustaining the kind of serious research needed to get any chance on the job
market and land papers in the best journals is difficult enough by itself. To do so when teaching eight
classes a year is even more difficult. And when one adds an outside job during the semester and even
more outside work during the summer, we find it difficult to see how anyone could find the time to
do research. To this we would add that having a serious chance on the job market will require not just
excellent research but also networking and service. Job candidates are expected to demonstrate that
they care about teaching with extensive documentation. They are expected to show that they are
committed to developing their departments with a bunch of outside of class stuff. All of this goes
into one’s job market materials. And being on the job market, constantly tailoring one’s application is
a job in itself that distracts from teaching and research. But if the adjunct forgoes finding outside
labor in order to pursue their research, networking, service, and job applications, the fruits of much
6https://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2015/04/more-on-adjuncts-thanks-kevin-carson-for-further-evidence-o
n-my-behalf
of this extra work will go to the institution that employs them. A publication in one of the best
journals by an adjunct teaching eight classes a year rather than a research professor teaching very few
classes is still a publication in one of the best journals. It is just that in the case of the adjunct, the
employer gets the fancy publication for free. And in the case of the research professor, the institution
pays top dollar for the fancy publication.
So here is our claim: Adjuncts are under pressure to publish, do service, network, and
constantly refine their job market materials. Some do. Some do not. It is meaningful to compare the
adjuncts under pressure to publish and do service with others who are under the same or less
pressure. And it is meaningful to compare the work adjuncts actually do in response to that pressure
with those who do the same level of  work in response to the same or less pressure.
Again, we think what the employer actually gets and what employees are actually under
pressure to give the employer is more important to assessing the value of work than just looking at
what their contracts say they are expected to give. Consider the lazy professor with tenure who never
publishes. It doesn’t matter that their contract says 70% of their time is to be allocated to research.
The university gets no research from them. And so that cannot be tallied into our calculation of what
the university gets from the lazy professor. On the other hand, suppose an adjunct, follow Brennan
and Magness’ advice, and publishes in the best journals. Then even though that is not in their
contract, that should be factored into what the university gets from hiring them. This allows for the
following comparisons.
First, consider an adjunct who responds to the relevant pressure by forgoing outside work.
Instead, they follow Brennan and Magness’ advice and sustain a research program. Suppose they
volunteer for service and that they network. They will make (using Brennan and Magness’ numbers)
$26,500 a year on average with no health insurance or other benefits. Compare them with a tenure
track faculty member under pressure to do the same and who does the same but who also teaches
only two or three classes a semester. On average (again using Brennan and Magness’ numbers) they
will make $70,791 a year with plenty of health insurance and other benefits. For tenured associate
professors they will make $81,124 on average. And they will not be under any pressure at all to do
research. But even if they do such research and publish in the best journals like the adjunct does, the
university gets the fancy publications for free from the productive adjunct. That is a good deal.
Second, some adjuncts ignore the relevant pressures and choose to simply fulfill the official
terms of their contract. No publishing, networking, or service. No endless tailoring and modifying of
their job market materials. Again, they will receive $26,500 from their institution and receive no
benefits. Suppose they end up following Brennan and Magness’ advice to take outside work. We can
compare them to a lazy tenure track professor who never does anything but teach their two or three
classes a semester. Again, the tenure track professor will make $70,791 with plenty of health
insurance and other benefits. It is true that the lazy assistant professor is under the following
pressure: If they do not publish and do no service, then they will not get tenure. But as Brennan and
Magness take pains to emphasize, the adjunct is under the very same pressure. If the adjunct does not
publish, they will not get tenure either. The difference is that in the meantime, while neither is
publishing and while the adjunct is teaching many more classes than the lazy tenure track professor,
the latter will have six years worth of a high paying salary job with extensive benefits while the
adjunct will be stuck with a mere $26,500 and no benefits. For tenured professors, they will make
much more still. And they are under no pressure whatsoever to continue publishing or to do anything
beyond the most minimal service. Compared in this way, the university is getting a lot out of the
labor of its adjuncts. $26,500 for four classes a semester and no research or service is a better deal for
the institution than $70,791 or more for only a few classes a semester and no research or service.
Per publication, per class, and per unit of service, adjuncts are much, much cheaper for an
institution than professors. They are valuable.
Now, as Brennan and Magness point out, the adjunct can escape their situation. They have a
good exit option. They can go work for Geico. But, as we have seen, the same is true of the college
students that Brennan and Magness think are exploited by university faculty through gen ed
requirements. Just like adjuncts, they can drop out and go work for Geico. If that is a good exit
option for people with masters and PhD degrees, then it is a good exit option for people with
highschool diplomas.
So we think that looking at what contracts say, as Brennan and Magness do, is not the best
way to compare labor. It is better to look at the wages of various faculty in light of what they are
under pressure to do and in light of what they actually do in response to that pressure. We should
look at what they do directly rather than what they do by proxy. And it is worth comparing such
faculty with other faculty that are under the same pressure or less and that do the same work in
response to that pressure. When this sort of comparison is included in our picture, we see that
employers get a lot out of  adjuncts. Adjunct labor is exceedingly valuable to employers.
VI. Perverse Incentives
The higher-education industry is characterized by various features that, taken together, leave some
members of the profession in a highly vulnerable position–as Brennan and Magness thoroughly
demonstrate in Cracks in the Ivory Tower.
As Brennan and Magness point out, the first priority of most prospective academics is to
find an academic job of any kind: “what potential faculty want first and foremost is a job.” (p. 23).
Concerns about the quality of the position and the favorability of the terms of employment are
secondary. (p. 23) These are people who have often spent between three and ten years in
post-secondary education, training to be qualified for academic employment. (p.196) But, Brennan
and Magness claim, “in most fields, a Ph.D trains you for exactly one thing: to be a professor.” (p. 23)
Academic job candidates, then, are people who want very badly to work in higher education, have
spent a long time in training to be qualified to work in higher education, and are not qualified by this
training to work in any industry other than higher education. These conditions create a powerful
incentive to accept an unfavorable offer of employment in higher education than one would if these
conditions were not present.
But, as Brennan and Magness point out, most academic fields produce “more Ph.Ds per year
than there are jobs for Ph.Ds.” (p. 23 see also chapter 8) Brennan and Magness point out that this
happens because Ph.D-granting institutions are subject to perverse incentives to do so. Faculty at
such institutions have several incentives to take on Ph.D. students: first, the more Ph.Ds one
supervises, the greater one’s influence over the profession is, and the more prestige one has. Second,
it is often more fun to teach highly intelligent, informed, and en- gaged graduate students than it is to
teach one’s less informed and disengaged introductory- level undergraduates. Graduate-level courses
can also be more fulfilling because they connect more closely with one’s areas of active academic
research. Having Ph.D students also means being able to outsource the more unpleasant aspects of
academic work: grading, data entry, finding references and assembling literature reviews. (pp. 200 - 3).
Administratively, Ph.D- granting programs enhance the prestige of the institution, which makes
fundraising easier, among other benefits. (p. 205 – 6)
Brennan and Magness claim that “the fundamental problem is that the total number of new
Ph.Ds is growing at a much faster rate than the academic job market can absorb, and these numbers
have remained stable or even slightly increased over the past decade.” (p.164) This is due to perverse
incentives experienced by Ph.D-granting departments, which are disconnected from the job market
and do not track the interests of their students. But, as Brennan and Magness are careful to stress, it
is important not to moralize when people and institutions respond to perverse incentives. It is not
the case that the reason why there are more new Ph.Ds than jobs is that Ph.D-granting departments
are evil, or that department chairs are sociopaths, or that they have been seduced by the Dark Side.
Rather, the reason is that Ph.D-granting departments experience incentives to benefit themselves by
enrolling graduate students. It is more pleasant and rewarding to teach graduate students: graduate
students are more advanced and engaged than undergraduates, and one’s teaching can be more
closely connected to one’s research specialization in graduate courses. There are fewer graduate
students than undergrads, which means that the grading burden is lighter and less unpleasant. Faculty
also benefit when graduate students serve as teaching and research assistants, who perform much of
the least pleasant tasks associated with teaching and research, including grading exams, setting up
experiments, compiling literature reviews, etc. (p. 201 ff) This creates a cost for those graduate
students down the road, in the form of an unfavorable job market, but because the benefits of this
arrangement are experienced by the departments and the costs are not, the departments themselves
experience no disincentives, and the practice continues.7
The students are also responding rationally to their incentives. The typical incoming Ph.D
student is highly motivated to pursue graduate study. She is an intelligent and engaged student whose
desire is to learn more about a field of study in which she is intensely interested, and to acquire a
credential that will make her eligible to pursue a career in her field as an academic. She knows that the
job market is unfavorable, but humans as a group are adept at overestimating their own abilities and
ignoring information that disconfirms their prior beliefs. And, in any case, Brennan and Magness
indicate that pursuing a Ph.D is not very risky: “in general, Ph.Ds who fail to obtain long-term
faculty jobs land on their feet and instead find good jobs elsewhere.” (p. 197)
VII. Opportunity Costs
Brennan and Magness write that
there are no free lunches. Trade-offs are everywhere. The most basic, important, and
frequently-evaded economic idea is that everything you do comes at the expense of
everything you didn’t do. ...adjunct’s rights activists demand that universities pay adjuncts
better salaries, provide them with more benefits, and give them more status. In
previously published work, ...we calculated how much it would cost universities in the
US to give adjuncts what they demand. A low estimate is $30 billion extra per year,
which turns out to be a 30 percent increase in faculty costs. In the past, we pointed out
the banal and obvious truth that spending $30 billion more per year on adjuncts means
$30 billion is not being spent on, say, scholarships for poor, first-generation, or
under-represented minority students. (p. 13)
It is true that the additional money to bring adjunct faculty salaries and benefits to a level on a par
with their full-time colleagues would have to come from somewhere. But it is not true that this
money would have to be acquired by raiding funds for scholarships that benefit vulnerable students.
It is important to recognize that adjunct faculty are not in direct competition for funding specifically
with poor students, first-generation students, and students from under- represented minority groups.
7 Of course, these perverse incentives are not the only relevant motivating factors. The behavior of
individual faculty members and administrators, as well as academic departments and other
administrative units is influenced by a variety of factors, including their values and goals for their
departments, institutions, fields, academia as a whole, and society at large. But the perverse
incentives identified by Brennan and Magness are real and powerful, and are what academic hiring
units are responding to when they act so as to rely heavily on adjunct labor.
It is also true that every dollar spent increasing the compensation packages of adjunct faculty
is a dollar not spent on scholarship funds for vulnerable students, but that is true of literally every
dollar spent on anything other than scholarships for vulnerable students. This includes any money
spent on salaries for tenure-track faculty, or on raises for well-compensated tenured faculty, or on
building maintenance and groundskeeping, or on a new climbing wall in the Student Recreation
Center. Note that at this stage, Brennan and Magness have not made any claim about whether the
adjuncts’ demands are justified. The argument here appears to be simply that doing so creates
opportunity costs for scholarships benefitting vulnerable students, and these opportunity costs tell
against meeting the adjuncts’ demands. (If, on the other hand, this is not the argument Brennan and
Magness intend to make, then it is unclear what purpose is served by using adjunct compensation as
the central example of an expenditure that generates opportunity costs, or by using scholarship
funding for vulnerable students as the central example of an opportunity cost generated by such an
expenditure. It would have been just as easy to use raises for tenure-track faculty as an example.) But
if the mere existence of such opportunity costs tells against allocating funds to improve the
compensation packages of adjunct faculty, independently of whether doing so is independently
justifiable, it is hard to see why it wouldn’t also tell against a host of other, equally justifiable ways of
allocating funds. After all, a dollar spent on raises for tenured faculty is a dollar not spent on
scholarships for vulnerable students, no less so than a dollar spent on raises for more vulnerable
faculty—the scholarship-related opportunity costs are identical.
VIII. Methodological Considerations About Far Fetched Cases
We have used a number of far fetched examples to make our points. We gave the example about
sweatshop workers who are irrational in such a way that they won’t look up to find better job
opportunities. We gave the example about people debating whether adjuncts are murdered because
they got themselves into a position to be vulnerable to murder. Here we would like to say a bit about
why we are using such examples and why we think it is apt to do so.
We want to know about the fundamental nature of exploitation. For a theory, claim, or
principle to get the fundamental nature of something right, it needs to get it right in all possible
circumstances. It can’t just get things right in actual circumstances. So if we encounter a claim about
exploitation, such as one offered by Brennan and Magness, and that claim has the implication that
that something is not a case of exploitation when it clearly is, then that is enough to refute the claim.
It does not matter whether the example is actual or merely possible.
On one reading of  Brennan and Magness, they employ the following principle:
BM1: If  someone has good exit options, they are not exploited.
We argue that this principle gets an actual case wrong and a far fetched case wrong. The actual case is
the case Brennan and Magness themselves give: the case of college students. Brennan and Magness
think they are exploited by the gen ed requirement. But they have good exit options. So, if Brennan
and Magness are right about college students being exploited, then BM1 is false. The far fetched case
is the one about sweatshop workers. They have exit options. And yet they are exploited. Since we are
interested in the fundamental nature of exploitation, we must get both the actual and merely possible
cases right. And that is one reason merely possible far fetched cases are appropriate for our inquiry.
On our other reading of  Brennan and Magness, they appeal to the following principle
BM2: If someone has good exit options and the items on the List, then they are not
exploited.
And we think BM2 is motivated just by this idea: “Hey, look at all these embarrassing things about
adjuncts. And look at all these other bad things that aren’t happening to them. Therefore adjunct’s
aren’t exploited.” The point of the murder example isn’t that it is a realistic possibility. The point is
that it is a parody of what motivates Brennan and Magness’ principle about exploitation. We think
Brennan and Magness just point out a bunch of embarrassing things about adjuncts and a bunch of
bad things adjuncts do not suffer from . And then, out of the blue, they say that this implies that8
adjuncts aren’t exploited. Without taking the time to spell out how those things are relevant to
exploitation, their argument is incomplete. We think that to argue that adjuncts are not exploited in
this way is just as silly as it would be to argue that adjuncts in the relevant far fetched story are not
murdered.
Comapre with Jonathan Swift’s A Modest Proposal. He parodies the sort of reasoning others
employ. His parody is far-fetched. He proposes eating children. It is not realistic to suppose that
people would consider eating children. But that does not undermine the power of Swift’s proposal.
We can present our hypothetical example as a modest proposal as well. We could say, “Suppose you
want to kill people without murdering them. Here is how: Find people who have lots of embarrassing
things about them such as the items on Brennan and Magness’ List. Use their propensity to get
themselves in a bad situation. Stab them to death. Then you will definitely be off the hook. You may
have killed them. But it was not murder. So you’re good. No one would adopt this strategy. But we
think that, on the present interpretation, Brennan and Magness are reasoning as we do in the parody.
Though far-fetched in certain respects, and though no prosecutor or defense attorney would use this
reasoning, the reasoning is still bad. Legal reasoning can be bad even if it is legal reasoning that is
never actually employed by a lawyer. And since that is essentially the very reasoning we think Brennan
and Magness are engaging in, we think that we do not need our parody to be realistic in order for us
to make our point about Brennan and Magness.
Compare with what physicists do. They employ far fetched, non actual cases. Consider
Schrodinger’s Cat. It is a far fetched example. No one has actually put a cat in such a situation. It is
unlikely that anyone ever will. Nevertheless, it is a useful example for making points about physics.
Something similar may be said for Einstein’s Grandfather Paradox and thought experiments about
frictionless planes. Physicists find farfetched examples to be useful for making points. If it is good
enough for physicists to use merely possible examples, it is good enough for us.
IX. Conclusion
We think Brennan and Magness’ work on this topic is valuable and serves to deepen our
understanding of exploitation and the nature of adjunct work. Nevertheless, we strongly disagree
with them. We think the considerations they raise do not in any way support the view that adjuncts
are not exploited. And their arguments in Cracks in the Ivory Tower actually support the view that
adjuncts are exploited.
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